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Secure Hardware Design

Course Overview

  • Institution: MIT
  • Course code: 6.5950
  • Track: Hardware Security
  • Tier: A
  • Role: Mainline
  • Level: Not standardized by provider (use prerequisites)
  • Last reviewed: 2026-07-28

MIT's Secure Hardware Design builds a modern hardware-security spine from an open text, CTF, labs, and code, with exercises targeting real processors whose availability must be checked.

Why choose this course

Mainline course. A reliable option that can serve as a main course or strong alternative.

Before you start

  • Recommended foundation: Digital Logic and Computation Structures
  • Recommended foundation: Computer Architecture

Verifiable learning outcomes

  • Explain the core models in Hardware Security, including their assumptions and limits
  • Solve representative derivations and problems, checking units, limiting cases, or numerical results
  • Complete a reproducible experiment or implementation with raw data, parameters, versions, and verification

Workload and pacing

13 weeks at 11 hours/week. This maintainer planning estimate is derived from course role and the density of public practice and labs; it is not a provider workload promise. Pilot two weeks while logging instruction, practice, lab, and review time, then adjust the remaining plan when actual effort differs by more than 25%.

Safety level

Low energy. Keep work isolated, current-limited, and low energy; verify ratings, grounding, short-circuit risk, and emergency shutdown before power-up.

Course Resources

Software, hardware, and cost

Software

  • Maintainer-suggested open-source/free verification path: Verilator, Yosys, GTKWave, Python 3, and Jupyter
  • The resource inventory lists public code coverage; pin interpreter, dependencies, toolchain, datasets, and PDK versions where applicable

Hardware

  • The resource inventory lists lab coverage; use compliant institutional access to the following borrowed or shared equipment: a course-supported test board, isolated/current-limited power, and logic analyzer; use side-channel equipment only in a compliant lab. Verify ratings, authorization, and safety conditions only after the provider lab manual explicitly calls for them

Cost note

Prefer open-source/free simulation tools; this is not a provider equipment requirement. Access specialized instruments or facilities through a compliant institution rather than personal purchase; access, consumable, and license costs vary by provider, region, and institution.

Public resource coverage

Resource type Completeness
Video No public material
Notes Complete
Practice Complete
Labs Complete
Exams No public material
Code Complete

Resources and access

Resource Access License Status Verified
Course home Open access CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 for site materials; third-party exclusions may apply Listed by official page 2026-07-28

“Listed by official page” means the link was discovered on a successfully fetched official source on the verification date; it does not guarantee that every region or account can open the target directly. Access does not grant redistribution rights. Re-check the provider page, target link, and third-party notices before downloading, adapting, or publishing material.

Practice and Verification

Practice loop

Secure Hardware Design · MIT 6.5950: Auditable Hardware Threat Model and Mitigation Experiment

This is a maintainer-suggested self-study project for Secure Hardware Design · MIT 6.5950, not an official course assignment. Define an authorized threat for a self-authored RTL model in Hardware Security, simulate a timing side channel or fault, and evaluate constant-time or redundancy mitigations without targeting third-party devices.

Origin: Maintainer-suggested project

Deliverables

  • A threat model defining assets, attacker capability, trust boundaries, authorization, and unacceptable impact
  • Self-authored RTL or software model, attack simulation, baseline, and mitigation sources
  • At least 1,000 baseline, attack, and mitigated traces with raw leakage or fault-success data
  • A defensive report comparing security benefit, area or latency cost, and residual risk

Verification

  • Show the baseline attack exceeds random guessing on synthetic traces with confidence intervals, not a single run
  • Reduce attack advantage by at least 80% after mitigation or explain the shortfall and remaining leakage
  • Cover all-zero and all-one secrets, repeated inputs, reset-time behavior, and faults that do not trigger
  • Cross-check conclusions with a second statistical test or independent fault checker

Reproducibility

  • Commit the self-authored model, attack and mitigation code, tests, threat model, and a README
  • Pin tool versions, synthesis parameters, seeds, and every experiment configuration
  • Preserve sanitized synthetic raw traces, checksums, and the generated report

Safety boundary: Simulation only — Test only self-authored, explicitly authorized simulation models; do not provide exploitation steps for third-party devices, real keys, or access-control bypasses.

Risks, gaps, and boundaries

The open text, CTF, and laboratories are modern, but exercises target real processors and require checking hardware availability.

Completion evidence

  • Weekly learning log with time, questions, corrected errors, decisions, next steps, and links to that week's reproducible artifacts
  • Design-review package with requirements and constraints, trade-offs, editable sources, applicable ERC/DRC/timing/stability checks, exports, and a reproduction test
  • Code repository with pinned dependencies and toolchain, a minimal run command, tests or waveform/benchmark checks, expected output, and license notes
  • Experiment package with schematic/setup, calibration record, raw data, uncertainty, safety checks, failed runs, and steps to rebuild plots from raw data